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1. Introduction 
The Irish healthcare system includes a complex mix of entitlements and financing mechanisms. For 
example, most medical cards are provided on an income-tested basis, and provide free access to in-
patient and out-patient care in public hospitals, to GP care, and to prescription drugs. Other 
elements of the system are provided on a universal basis, e.g., a universal entitlement to publicly 
subsidised care in public hospitals and a universal entitlement to a subsidy which caps monthly 
prescription drug costs. There is also tax relief on private health insurance premia1, which finances 
access to private hospitals and to consultants in private practice. Unreimbursed medical expenses 
are also eligible for tax relief at the standard tax rate of 20 per cent. Many potential reforms of the 
healthcare system involve changes to the mix of entitlements and their financing. Exploration of the 
likely implications of different policy options is essential if policy choices are to be guided by 
evidence on the likely consequences. This is true both for major structural reforms, such as the 
proposals for a Universal Health Insurance (UHI), and for marginal reforms, such as changes to 
income limits for the Medical Card scheme, and extensions of the medical card scheme to provide 
free care to particular age groups 
In this report, we concentrate on the major income-related entitlements in the current system i.e., 
the Medical Card and the GP Visit Card. We examine how the income test for such schemes can be 
modelled using the detailed income and demographic information in the Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions2. The approach taken applies the rules for income-related cards to each family in 
this nationally representative sample, using the information they provide on incomes and family 
composition. This is essential groundwork for later studies which will examine how the pattern of 
entitlements might change under different rules. A key feature of this microsimulation approach is 
that the likely impact of policies can be examined in advance, so that selection of policy options can 
be guided by evidence as to the likely impact on a nationally representative sample.  The work builds 
on SWITCH, the ESRI tax benefit model, and extends that model to deal with these income-related 
health service entitlements in a similar way to the means-tested benefits in the social welfare 
                                                          
1 For policies renewed or entered into on or after 1 May 2015 the tax relief per person covered by a policy will 
be limited to either: the full adult maximum amount of €1,000, or the relevant premium where this is lower. 
This applies for all individuals aged 21 and over, regardless of whether they are availing of a child premium 
(Revenue, 2015).  
2 Currently SWITCH is based on SILC data for 2010, with adjustments to incomes and the weighting scheme to 
ensure that results are representative of the 2015 population. Work on the inclusion of the latest available 
SILC data, for 2013, is currently under way. (See CSO, 2015 for the most recent results on measures of income 
poverty, deprivation and consistent poverty) 
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system. Future development of the SWITCH model will allow for the analysis of the structure of 
subsidies for the UHI premium; and for the impact of rules governing entitlement to medical and GP-
visit cards on work incentives. 
Almost 2 million people, or 43 per cent of the population, were covered by a Medical Card or GP 
Visit Card in 2013. Expenditure on the General Medical Services (GMS) scheme stood at €1,900m in 
2013.  These schemes are therefore of major significance for close to half of the total population, 
and eligibility for the schemes is predominantly based on a means-test, even with the recent 
extension of non-means-tested eligibility for those aged under 6 and over 70. Previous research has 
pointed to the importance of the medical card scheme with regard to the security it provides to 
card-holders (Russell and Corcoran, 2000), particularly in light of the unpredictable nature of usage 
of health services.  
An individual moving from unemployment to employment may find that their employment income 
raises them above the income threshold for a medical card, so that a gain in cash income may be 
reduced or offset by a reduction in the non-cash benefit afforded by the card. Thus, the means-
tested nature of the medical card may affect the financial incentive to work faced by such 
individuals. As eligibility for a medical card is determined essentially at family or tax unit level, 
unemployed individuals with families are more likely to experience such disincentives as the health 
service entitlements of both the individual and their children are affected. Some analysis of this issue 
using the SWITCH model was contained in Callan et al. (2006). 
Some steps have been taken to address the possible impact of medical cards on the financial 
incentive to work. The introduction of the GP Visit Card in 2005, with a higher income limit than the 
medical card, meant that some individuals would lose some, but not all, of the benefit of a medical 
card as their income increased.  Furthermore, long term unemployed medical cardholders can retain 
their medical card for up to three years after entering employment. 
The aim of this current report is to model the existing healthcare entitlements of all families in the 
nationally representative sample provided by SILC, based on their reported incomes, demographic 
characteristics and housing costs. This is essential before analysis of policy issues, such as reforms to 
the health service entitlements, or the structure of work incentives including healthcare 
entitlements, can be undertaken. Section 2 summarises key aspects of the means test governing 
eligibility for medical cards and GP visit cards. Section 3 presents background information on 
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model and describes the technical groundwork involved in the 
modelling process for medical cards and GP-visit cards. The issues involved go beyond the technical, 
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and have important implications for how the results should be interpreted in a policy context. 
Section 4 examines first how the incidence of medical cards varies across income levels. We then 
examine how modelled entitlements to medical and GP visit cards compare with the data gathered 
in SILC as to whether respondents report themselves as holding a card. There are several reasons 
why modelled entitlements may not coincide with reported holding of a card; we discuss these 
reasons, and their differing implications.  The total number of recipients modelled in SWITCH is also 
compared with administrative statistics from the HSE numbers. The main conclusions are drawn 
together in Section 5. 
2. Healthcare Entitlements and the Medical and GP Visit card 
Schemes 
Irish residents without Medical Card coverage are entitled to heavily subsidised public hospital care3, 
with a cap on charges in place. Non medical card holders are liable for a €100 fee to attend Accident 
and Emergency and are charged €75 per night for a hospital stay, capped at €750 per year. 
Entitlement to free primary care, such as GP services, is not available to all residents however. 
Medical cards allow holders to access GP services, community health services, dental services, 
ophthalmic and aural services, hospital care and a range of other services4 free of charge. 
Prescription medication is also provided free of charge excluding a €2.50 prescription charge, capped 
at €25 per person/family per month. A GP Visit Card covers the cost of attending a GP only. The GP 
Visit Card Scheme was introduced in 2005. The scheme sought to address two main issues – a 
concern that those over the medical card income limits but not on ‘high’ incomes may face financial 
difficulty in attending a GP and also that the sharp benefit withdrawal inherent in the medical card 
system may create an employment disincentive as well as cause financial hardship. 
Eligibility for the Medical and GP Visit card schemes is primarily income-based. Between 2001 and 
2008 those over 70 automatically received a medical card. The over-70s are now also means tested 
for a medical card, albeit with a higher income limit than younger age groups; in addition, since 
August 2015, over-70s are entitled to a GP Visit card irrespective of income. The income thresholds 
are based on age and family status as shown below in Table 1. The income limit for the over 70s is 
based on gross income5. For those under 70, allowances exist for children and rent/mortgage 
                                                          
3 Access to care can differ for those holding private health insurance however. 
4 Additional benefits include free school transport for children, exemption from state examination fees and a 
financial contribution towards school books. 
5 SWITCH currently uses the same income definition for the over 70s as the under 70s when means testing i.e. 
net income after all allowances. Modelling using the gross income definition for over 70s may result in the 
numbers of over 70s modelled as eligible for medical cards changing slightly but these changes are not 
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payments, childcare costs and travel to work costs. Eligibility assessment is based on the combined 
income of the applicant and their spouse after income tax, PRSI and USC have been deducted. In 
addition, where income is derived solely from Social Welfare sources or HSE allowances and the 
applicant is over the relevant income limit a medical card will be awarded. Medical expenses are not 
explicitly allowed against income but applicants and their dependants whose assessable income is in 
excess of the relevant income limit but for whom the HSE determines refusal of a medical card 
would cause ‘undue hardship’ are also awarded a medical card. Often known as ‘discretionary cards’ 
the HSE estimates that in 2010 5 per cent of Medical Cards were ‘discretionary’ as were 15 per cent 
of GP Visit cards. For 2013 these figures stood at 3 per cent and 21 per cent respectively (HSE, 2011 
and HSE, 2014a). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
expected to be substantial as those over 70 tend not to have housing costs, childcare costs and tend not to 
have large, if any, USC/Tax/PRSI liabilities. 
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Table 1: Medical Card and GP Visit Card Income limits (as of Spring 2015) 
Over 70 
  
Medical Card 
Weekly Rate 
(Gross) 
GP Visit Card 
Weekly Rate 
(Gross) 
 Single Person Aged 70 and Over   €500 €700* 
 Married/Co-habiting Couple Aged 70 and Over   €900 €1,400* 
Under 70 
    
Medical Card 
Weekly Rate 
GP Visit Card 
Weekly Rate 
 Single Person Living Alone   
   Aged up to 65 years   €184.00 €276.00 
 Aged 66 years and over   €201.50 €302.00 
 Single Person Living with Family   
   Aged up to 65 years   €164.00 €246.00 
 Aged 66 and over   €173.50 €260.00 
 Married Couple / Single Parent Families with 
Dependent Children   
   Aged up to 65 years   €266.50 €400.00 
 Aged 66 and over    €298.00 €447.00 
 Allowances   
   Allowance for first 2 children under 16 
financially dependant on applicant   €38.00 €57.00 
 For 3rd and subsequent children under 16 
financially dependant on applicant   €41.00 €61.50 
 Allowance for first 2 children over 16 years 
financially dependant on applicant   €39.00 €58.50 
 For 3rd and subsequent children over 16 yrs 
financially dependant on applicant   €42.50 €64.00 
 For a dependant over 16 years who is in full 
time third level education and not grant aided   €78.00 €117.00 
Source:  HSE (2014b) 
Notes: Where income is solely derived from Social Welfare sources or HSE allowances and the applicant is 
above the relevant income limit a medical card is still be awarded   
* Since 5 August 2015, those over 70 qualify for a GP Visit card irrespective of income; the income limits in the 
table applied earlier in 2015. 
 
3. Modelling of Medical and GP Visit cards 
Background to the SWITCH Model 
Policy changes are often considered in terms of their effects on a number of “hypothetical families”. 
This approach has severe limitations. For example, in Ireland less than one family in 20 falls into the 
category of “one-earner couple with 2 children” which attracts so much attention. Furthermore 
families within this category differ in terms of income, housing tenure, and other characteristics that 
affect their tax-benefit position. More fundamentally, analysis of hypothetical families - no matter 
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how well chosen - simply cannot give an overall picture of the impact of a policy change on incomes 
and work incentives. Tax-benefit models are based on large-scale nationally representative samples 
of households. This ensures that the models represent as fully as possible the great diversity of 
household circumstances relevant to tax and social welfare. SWITCH (Simulating Welfare and 
Income Tax CHanges), the ESRI tax-benefit model currently is based on data drawn from the CSO’s 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) for 2010. 
The survey gathered detailed information on the incomes and labour market participation of more 
than 4,600 households. The SWITCH database is adjusted from year to year to allow for key changes 
in incomes and population structure as forecast for the next budgetary year. Changes in social 
welfare rates, income tax rates, bands and allowances, and the structure of employee PRSI are taken 
into account in the model. The main advantage of the model is that analysis of policy options can be 
carried out before changes reported occur. The model allows for distributional analysis by income 
(for example the percentage change in income in each income decile following  a policy change) and 
also allows for the analysis of the distributional impact across different family types. In addition to 
distributional analysis the model allows for the analysis of poverty rates and work incentive 
measures such as replacement rates and marginal effective tax rates. 
 
Data Requirements and the Modelling Process 
In order to model entitlement to medical and GP Visit cards within the SWITCH model we must first 
calculate the ‘assessable income’ of potential applicants. In the model we first calculate income from 
all relevant sources (i.e. employment, self employment etc) for the applicant and their spouse (if 
present) and deduct income tax, PRSI and USC. We also allow for other applicable allowances such 
as housing costs, childcare costs and allowances for children as specified in Table 1. Travel-to-work 
costs are not available in the underlying SILC dataset and are not included at present.6 We focus on 
the aggregate assessable income for a family unit as defined by medical card regulations. Once 
assessable income has been calculated we then compare this income to the relevant income limit  
depending on the respondent’s age, family status (with/without children) and living situation (living 
alone or with family). If the family’s income is below the relevant Medical Card income limit they, 
and their dependants7 are modelled as having a Medical Card. If their income is above the Medical 
                                                          
6 One avenue for further work would be to allow for average travel to work costs. 
7 Dependants are all children (under the age of 16) and any 16-25 year olds who are financially dependent 
upon an applicant. A 16-25 year old is determined to be financially dependent upon the parental tax unit if 
their income is below the current Medical Card Income Guideline for a single person, living with family (HSE, 
2014b). 
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Card income limit but below the GP Visit card limit they, and their dependants, are modelled as 
having a GP Visit Card. If the person’s income is above the GP Visit card income limit they are 
modelled as having no card. As the process for evaluating if someone over the relevant income limit 
would receive a card based on ‘undue hardship’ grounds is not tightly governed by precise, 
quantitative rules we cannot model entitlement to cards on this basis.  This would require fuller 
information on medical conditions and medical expenses than is available in the survey.  
4. Results 
SWITCH calculates entitlement to a medical or GP Visit card as described above. Effectively the 
model assigns individuals and their dependants to one of three categories – ‘medical card’, ‘GP Visit 
card’ or ‘no card’.  In what follows we will refer to these medical and GP Visit cards as ‘modelled’ 
cards.  The data which forms the SWITCH database is the CSO’s SILC 2010 survey. In the survey, 
respondents are asked directly if they hold a medical card, a GP Visit card or no card. We refer to 
these as ‘reported cards’. Figure 1 shows how the incidence of both modelled and reported cards 
varies across the income distribution. The ‘modelled’ card status can be seen as an indicator of 
entitlement to a card or not, based on assessable income. The ‘reported’ card status is just that – 
whether a person reports holding a medical card, a GP Visit card or none at all. Due to the fact that 
SWITCH is currently based on 2010 data the  results presented in this  paper are for the year 2010 
and are based on the relevant income cut-offs for that year. 
There exists a variety of reasons that may explain why modelled and reported card status may differ.  
• Firstly medical card and GP Visit card entitlements are modelled based on the current 
financial situation of the individual at date of interview. Respondents with cards will have 
been assessed at some earlier date, and their financial situation may have changed such that 
if reassessed at the date of interview, they would no longer qualify8 .  
• Secondly, those holding ‘discretionary’ cards awarded on the basis of undue hardship as 
explained previously will, by definition, not satisfy the income-related criteria which are 
being modelled. The modelling is telling us that the individual does not qualify on income 
grounds; the data are telling us that the individual has a card for other reasons, possibly as a 
result of  the discretionary card process.  
                                                          
8 Medical cards are usually issued for 3 years. An individual’s medical card status may be subject to random 
review, however in general the onus is placed on the cardholder to informed the HSE of any change in their 
circumstances (http://hse.ie/eng/services/list/1/schemes/mc/about/reviewsandappeals/)   
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• Thirdly, there may be an issue of the non take-up of cards. People may be entitled to a 
medical or GP Visit card based on their income levels but for a variety of reasons9 do not 
hold a card.  
• Fourthly, there may be possible misreporting of income or medical card status in SILC or 
possible misreporting to the HSE when applying for a card.  
• Fifthly, a means test for those over 70 was introduced in 2009. As we are assessing eligibility 
in 2010 we have applied this means test to those over 70. In reality, however, it may have 
taken time to withdraw cards from those over 70 and who are over the income limit.  
• Finally, travel to work costs, allowable against income in the medical/GP Visit card means 
test, are not captured in SILC10. 
Even though we are dealing with a sample of the population in SWITCH/SILC we can apply a weight 
to the data to arrive at a representative view of the population and to allow us to compare our 
numbers with HSE statistics. The CSO provides weights with the SILC data which ensure the data is 
representative on the basis of a number of geographical and demographic grounds (for example 
region, age, gender and household composition). The SWITCH team build on the weights provided 
by the CSO to ensure that SWITCH is representative with regard to the CSO controls but also 
representative of the income distribution and social welfare population. (Keane et al., 2012) 
We begin by examining the distribution of medical cards over the income distribution as modelled 
by SWITCH. Keilthy (2009) examined the percentage of individuals with a medical card in each 
income decile. She finds a pattern in which individuals with low incomes are most likely to have 
medical cards, and those in the top half of the income distribution are much less likely to have 
medical cards. Keilthy’s analysis is limited by the fact that it operates using household equivalised11 
annual income deciles whereas medical card entitlements are in fact determined at family unit or 
“tax unit” level12 and current rather than annual income. The SWITCH model allows us to examine 
this issue more closely, using the correct tax unit level of analysis, and a measure of current rather 
than annual income, on which Keilthy’s results are based. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of 
                                                          
9 Non take-up may be ‘primary’ (i.e. for reasons such as ignorance of the scheme, reluctance to fill in the 
application form or a fear of stigmatisation) or ‘secondary’ (i.e. incorrectly being refused a card). For a full 
analysis of the issue of non-take-up of benefits see Van Oorschot (1995). 
10 Including an estimate of an average travel to work cost of €20 per week does not, however, alter hugely the 
results shown here. 
11 Equivalising income is the standard approach taken by the CSO to create income deciles. It takes account of 
household size and is arrived at by dividing total household income by a factor of 1 for the first adults, .66 for 
subsequent adults and .33 for children. 
12 A household may consist of a number of separate tax units which are taxed independently from one 
another. This is particularly the case in shared rented accommodation or when a working adult resides with 
their parents. In 2010 SWITCH identifies an average of  1.5 tax units per household. 
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Medical and GP Visit cards across the income distribution. The population  is divided into 10 equally 
sized groups based on income ranked from poorest to richest. These income groups (income deciles) 
are defined based on the current, equivalised disposable income. In this case we look at the 
distribution of income over tax units, which are close to the family unit used by the medical card 
scheme.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Tax Units with a Medical Card by Income Decile 
Source: SILC 2010 and authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model 
As expected, due to the fact that medical cards are based on a means test, a high proportion of 
those with the lowest incomes (the 30 per cent of tax units with the lowest incomes, termed the 
bottom three deciles) are modelled by SWITCH as being eligible for a medical card. It may seem 
surprising that close to half of those in the bottom income decile (the lowest 10 per cent of tax unit 
incomes) are modelled as being ineligible.  However, almost all (99 per cent) of those ineligible are 
aged 16-25 and are deemed dependent upon a parental tax unit whose income is above the relevant 
income limit. A higher proportion of deciles 2 and 3 are also modelled as being entitled to a card. 
The proportion entitled to a medical card then falls as income rises. Some tax units higher up the 
income distribution of disposable income  are modelled as eligible to receive medical cards (15-18 
per cent of deciles 6-8, 6 per cent of decile 9 and 1 per cent of decile 10). This is due to the fact that 
the disposable income measure used to rank households is based on net income (i.e. after tax, USC 
and PRSI) but the medical card means test includes allowances for costs such as housing and 
childcare costs.   
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
Lowest 
income 
decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest 
income 
decile 
Medical Card, SWITCH 
modelled 
Medical Card, SILC reported 
-10- 
 
The distribution of medical cards reported by SILC recipients differs from the modelled entitlements 
in two main respects.  
• First, for the two lowest income groups (the bottom two deciles), the proportions reporting 
having a medical card are substantially lower than the proportion entitled. Of the poorest 
income decile only 27 per cent report having a medical card, whereas the proportion 
modelled as entitled is close to double this figure. In the second income decile there is also a 
gap of 30 percentage points between those reporting entitlement (60 per cent) and those 
modelled as entitled (close to 90 per cent) .  
• Second, for the two highest income deciles, the proportions reporting having a medical card 
are above the proportions modelled as being eligible. One in 5 of those in the  highest 
income decile (the top 10 per cent of the population by income) reports having a medical 
card, while very few of this group are modelled as having an entitlement to a medical card. 
The former result suggests that closer investigation of this apparent non-take-up of medical cards 
among the lowest income decile would be of interest. Such a study would be a substantial 
undertaking in its own right. While  not within the scope of the present paper, we flag this issue for 
potential future investigation. For example, it might be the case that the bottom decile of tax units 
contains significant numbers of young unemployed persons who may be eligible for medical cards, 
but if healthy, may not register for or take up this entitlement. This issue is examined further later in 
the section. 
 
Table 2 shows a cross-classification of tax units in SILC, depending on whether or not they report 
having a medical card, and on whether or not they are modelled as entitled to a medical card on 
income grounds. ‘Without medical card’ indicates that a tax unit reports that it holds a GP Visit card 
or no card at all. The numbers on the diagonal indicate the proportions where the SWITCH 
prediction on entitlement agrees with the respondent’s answer,  i.e., of the total number of tax 
units, 20 per cent hold a medical card and are eligible based on their income as calculated in 
SWITCH. 57 per cent of the population are deemed by SWITCH as ineligible for a medical card and do 
not report having one in SILC.  This indicates that in 77 per cent of cases SWITCH and SILC ‘agree’. 
The remaining 23 per cent consist of 9 per cent of cases assessed by  SWITCH  as ineligible for a 
medical card on income grounds,  but reporting that they do hold a card; and  14 per cent of  cases 
who report that they do not have a medical card, but who are modelled as being eligible for a 
medical card based on their current income. 
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Table 2: Medical Cards: Modelled Entitlements and Respondents’ Answers  
    SWITCH (modelled) 
    Medical Card 
Without 
Medical Card 
Reported by SILC 
respondents 
Medical Card 
20% 9% 
Without 
Medical Card 14% 57% 
Source: SILC 2010 and authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model 
 
A similar analysis indicates greater divergences between the numbers reporting GP visit cards and 
the numbers modelled as being entitled to such a card. Figure 2 shows that most of those with 
incomes in the bottom two deciles are eligible for a full medical card – as a result, they do not 
receive a GP Visit Card. At somewhat higher incomes (deciles 3, 4 and 5) the proportion modelled as 
eligible for a GP Visit card  is higher, between 18 and 29 per cent, as some of those who do not meet 
the medical card means test do qualify under the higher income limits for the GP Visit Card scheme. 
Eligibility for GP Visit Cards is very low for deciles 6 and 7, but rises again for deciles 8 and 9. One key 
factor contributing to this pattern is that those aged  over 70 face a much higher income limit than 
that for those aged under 70. Thus, high income cases qualifying for a GP Visit Card may often reflect 
this aspect of the system. 
The distribution of modelled GP Visit cards in SWITCH is in contrast with the reported holding of a 
GP Visit card as reported in SILC. Coverage is low across the income distribution with only a small 
peak in coverage for those on low to middle incomes as would be expected. In fact, the second 
highest rate of reported GP Visit card coverage is in decile 6 with just over 4 per cent of this decile 
reporting having a GP Visit card. If we look at the total numbers of people modelled as being eligible 
for a card, SWITCH estimates that close to 622,000 individuals are eligible for a card based on the 
means test but just under 134,000 people report holding a GP Visit card. These numbers tie in with 
previous research by Callan and Keane (2008) which, using a number of approaches, suggested that 
take-up of GP Visit cards ranged from 17-43 per cent using SILC 2005. A crude estimate for 2010 
comparing the SILC and SWITCH numbers suggests that take-up of the GP Visit card is 22 per cent 
but this area warrants further investigation, particularly a profile of the types of individuals who do 
not seem to be taking up the GP Visit card despite being eligible. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Tax Units with a GP Visit Card by Income Decile 
Source: SILC 2010 and authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model  
 
Table 3 shows a breakdown in the percentage of tax units holding a GP visit card, or not, in SWITCH 
and SILC. ‘Without GP Visit card’ indicates that a tax unit holds a medical card or no card at all. 
Again, the numbers on the diagonal indicate the proportion correctly ‘predicted’ by SWITCH. Just 1 
per cent of tax units are deemed eligible by SWITCH for a GP Visit Card and report having one in SILC. 
About 85 per cent of the population are deemed ineligible for a GP Visit Card (qualifying either for a 
Medical Card or no card at all) and report not having one. Therefore, as regards GP Visit Cards, in 86 
per cent of cases SWITCH and SILC agree. Some 2 per cent of the population are modelled as 
ineligible for a GP Visit Card and report having one while 13 per cent are deemed eligible for a GP 
Visit Card based on current income but do not report holding one. This provides another perspective 
on the apparent non-take-up of entitlements to the GP Visit Card, which seems to be substantial. 
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Table 3: GP Visit Cards: Modelled Entitlements and Self-Reported Status 
    SWITCH (modelled) 
    GP Visit Card 
Without GP 
Visit Card 
Reported by SILC 
respondents 
GP Visit Card 1% 2% 
Without GP 
Visit Card 13% 85% 
Source: SILC 2010 and authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model  
 
Finally, we can examine the crossover between SWITCH (modelled cards) and SILC (reported cards) 
with respect to holding any card, Medical or GP Visit. 27 per cent of the population are eligible for 
either card and report having one, while 47 per cent are ineligible on income grounds and do not 
hold either card. In total, therefore, SWITCH and SILC ‘agree’ in 74 per cent of cases. 6 per cent are 
deemed ineligible for either card but report holding one. This group will include some cards awarded 
under the ‘undue hardship’ rule. 21 per cent are modelled as being eligible for one of the cards but 
do not hold any. This group will contain those who are eligible but, for some reason, have not taken 
up the card.  
 
Table 4: Proportion Correctly Predicted: All Cards 
    SWITCH (modelled) 
    
Any card 
(Medical or 
GP) No card 
SILC (reported) 
Any card 
(Medical or 
GP) 
27% 6% 
No card 21% 47% 
Source: SILC 2010 and authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model 
 
As mentioned above there exists a range of reasons why modelled card status and  reported card 
status may differ. We can briefly examine some of the possible reasons for differences here. The 
pattern of Medical and GP cards across the income distribution and the differences between 
SWITCH and SILC certainly seem to point to a take-up issue, particularly for GP cards and medical 
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cards at the lower end of the income distribution. This issue warrants future research to examine the 
traits of tax units who do not appear to take up the benefit, even when entitled on income grounds. 
Another possible explanation for differences between modelled and reported card status is the fact 
that SWITCH can only model cards based on income grounds and not cards that are awarded under 
the ‘undue hardship’ grounds due to the fact that SILC does not contain information on expenditure 
on medical expenses and the fact that the strict quantitative rules do not apply in the case of undue 
hardship.  
SILC does contain information on self-assessed health status and whether a respondent reports 
having a long standing chronic illness or health condition. Individuals over the age of 15 are asked to 
rate their health on a 5 point scale (very bad, bad, fair, good very good). If we examine the health 
status of all those over 15, 85 per cent report having good or very good health while 25 per cent 
report a long standing illness or health condition as shown in column (i) Table 5. Of the group who 
are modelled as eligible for a medical card but who report not having one (column (iii)) 93 per cent 
report good/very good health. Of the group who are modelled as being eligible for a medical card 
and also report having one in SILC (column (ii)) only 67 per cent rate their health as good/very good. 
Similarly,  16 per cent of the eligible non-take-up group (column (iii)) report a chronic illness while 50 
per cent of those eligible and taking up the card have a chronic illness or health condition. The final 
column, column (iv) may include some of those who have been awarded discretionary cards , i.e., 
they are modelled as ineligible based on their current income but report holding a card. We can see 
that this group reports a poorer health status than average with 31 per cent reporting fair/bad/very 
bad health and half have a chronic illness. Their health status and illness profile is almost identical to 
those who hold a medical card and are eligible based on income grounds (column (ii)).  
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Table 5 : Health and Chronic Illness Status 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
  
Total over 
15 
population 
Modelled as 
eligible and 
has 
reported 
medical 
card 
Modelled as 
eligible but 
reports not 
having a 
Medical 
Card 
 
Has a 
reported 
Medical 
Card but not 
modelled 
(Possible 
discretionary 
card) 
Health Status:         
Very Good 49 27 59 31 
Good 36 40 34 38 
Total Very Good/Good 85 67 93 69 
Fair 12 27 6 22 
Bad 2 5 0 6 
Very Bad 1 1 0 3 
Total Fair, Bad/Very Bad 15 33 7 31 
          
          
Chronic Illness:         
Has a chronic illness 25 50 16 49 
Does not have a chronic illness 75 50 84 51 
Source: SILC 2010 and authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model  
Table 6 examines non take-up of medical cards  (i.e., cases where a modelled entitlement exists, but 
respondents report that they do not have a card) within the bottom decile on the basis of age and 
health status. Those aged 16-34 make up 63 per cent of all non take-up cases within the bottom 
decile. Approximately 96 per cent of all non take-up cases have a self-reported health status of good 
to very good while only 4 per cent report being in fair health. This indicates that non take-up in the 
bottom income decile may be due to healthy people not taking up their entitlement. 
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Table 6: Non Take-up of Medical Cards in Lowest Income Decile by Age and Health Status 
 
Health Status 
  
Very 
Good Good Fair Bad Very Bad Total 
  % 
16-24 24 8 0 0 0 32 
25-34 26 5 0 0 0 31 
35-44 8 3 1 0 0 12 
45-54 3 7 1 0 0 12 
55-64 3 7 2 0 0 12 
65-69 0 0 0 0 0 0 
70 and older 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 65 31 4 0 0 100 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model 
 
Table 7 shows a breakdown of non take-up in the bottom decile on the basis of age and employment 
status. Non take-up is highest amongst those in employment and in education. Since those in 
education are to be found in the 16-34 age band non take-up may again be linked to  good health. 
The incidence of non take-up among the employed might also be due to good health or it may 
reflect a misconception among some employees as to their eligibility for a medical card.  
Table 7: Non Take-up of Medical Cards in Lowest Income Decile by Age and Employment 
Status 
 
Employment Status 
  Employed  Unemployed 
Home 
Duties 
In 
Education Others Total 
  % 
16-24 4 6 0 23 0 32 
25-34 13 1 6 12 0 31 
35-44 8 0 2 2 0 12 
45-54 7 1 4 0 0 12 
55-64 4 0 4 0 3 12 
65-69 0 0 0 0 0 0 
70 and older 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 36 9 16 36 4 100 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model  
 
Comparison to HSE Statistics 
Finally, we compare the total numbers modelled as having a medical or GP Visit card in SWITCH with 
numbers reported by the HSE for 2010 in Table 8 below. The HSE reported 1.62 million medical card 
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holders for 2010 or 1.54 million excluding discretionary medical cards. SWITCH models 1.57 million 
individuals as being eligible for a medical card in 2010 so that overall the ratio of SWITCH medical 
card-holders to the HSE (non-discretionary) number is 102 per cent. The HSE report 120,000 
individuals receiving a GP Visit card in 2010, or 100,000 excluding discretionary GP Visit cards. 
SWITCH models over 600,000 individuals as eligible for a GP Visit card. These results are consistent 
with our findings of GP Visit card coverage across the income distribution (Figure 2) and suggest a 
take-up issue for GP Visit cards. 
 
Table 8: Medical & GP Visit card Recipients– SWITCH and HSE, 2010  
  ’000s 
  2010 
N on medical card, HSE 1,616 
N on medical card, HSE excl discretionary 1,535 
N on medical card, SWITCH 1,567 
SWITCH:HSE (incl. discretionary cards) ratio 97% 
SWITCH:HSE (excl. discretionary cards) ratio 102% 
    
N on GP card, HSE 117 
N on GP card, HSE excl discretionary 100 
N on GP card, SWITCH 622 
SWITCH:HSE (incl. discretionary) ratio 530% 
SWITCH:HSE (excl. discretionary) ratio 622% 
    
N on medical/GP card, HSE 1,733 
N on medical/GP card, HSE excl 
discretionary 1,635 
N on medical/GP card, SWITCH 2,189 
SWITCH:HSE (incl. discretionary) ratio 126% 
SWITCH:HSE (excl. discretionary) ratio 134% 
Source: HSE Annual Reports & SWITCH 
Table 9 compares the age distribution of those modelled as being entitled to a medical card to the 
distribution reported in the annual Primary Care Reimbursement Service (PCRS) report produced by 
the HSE. For the majority of age bands  the ratio of modelled medical card recipients to HSE figures 
ranges from 90-112 per cent.  
One age band with a high ratio is the 25-34 years olds. SWITCH models approximately 249,000 25-34 
year olds as being eligible while the PCRS reports that there are only 175,000 medical card holders in 
this age band. As previously discussed, non take-up may be a result of non-take-up due to good 
health or a lack of awareness of eligibility. The higher proportion being modelled as eligible in this 
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age band has consequences for the modelled eligibility of any subsequent dependants explaining the 
difference between SWITCH and HSE numbers for the under 5s. 
Another age band with a sizeable difference between HSE and SWITCH numbers are the 75s and 
older. The HSE reports approximately 219,000 medical card holders while SWITCH models only 
153,000 as being eligible. This difference may be due to the possibility that the over 75s are more 
likely to be in receipt of a discretionary card or it may reflect that some of this age cohort received 
their medical card prior to the introduction of the means test for the over 70s in 2008 and had not 
returned their medical card in 2010. 
Table 9: Medical card Recipients by Age Band – SWITCH and HSE, 2010  
Age Band 
HSE excl 
discretionary SWITCH 
SWITCH:HSE 
(excl disc) 
ratio 
  000s 000s % 
Under 5 110 144 131 
5-11 161 166 103 
12-15 80 80 99 
16-24 142 136 96 
25-34 175 249 143 
35-44 175 195 112 
45-54 143 141 99 
55-64 143 131 92 
65-69 78 60 76 
70-74 109 113 103 
75 and older 219 153 70 
Total 1535 1,562 102 
Source: HSE Annual Reports and authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model 
Note:    The number of cards reported by the HSE for each age band has been reduced by 5% in order to 
account for discretionary cards, as the SWITCH estimates model income-related eligibility only and not 
discretionary cards. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper is focused firmly on modelling entitlements to medical cards and to GP visit cards, based 
on data from SILC on incomes, housing costs and family composition.  This is an essential building 
block for future work exploring the introduction of Universal Health Insurance, and examining the 
impact of medical card entitlements (and their withdrawal) on financial incentives to work. Our 
analysis has demonstrated that the SWITCH model has been successfully developed to use SILC data 
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to model income-related entitlements to medical cards and GP visit cards. The total numbers 
modelled as eligible for medical cards are close to official numbers of recipients. However, we also 
find prima facie evidence of substantial non-take-up of medical cards and, even more so, of GP visit 
cards. Further and more detailed investigation of these findings is needed, as such results have 
implications both for the assessment of the existing system, and for the assessment of possible 
changes. 
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